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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin's campaign finance reform 
Boris Berezovsky does not appear to be a desperate man just yet, but he has 
turned up the rhetorical heat considerably, and the result may be the burning of 
some very important bridges. The prosecutor general's office has set two 
appointments to question Berezovsky in connection with the financial 
arrangements at Aeroflot. Thus far, Boris Abramovich has missed one meeting 
and seems intent to remain abroad for the second. In a radical departure from his 
recent "quiet exile" approach, Berezovsky has decided to address some of the 
issues arising from the prosecutor's inquiries. 
 
In a live interview with the Hero of the Day Program, Berezovsky, who was in 
New York, denied that there was "criminal activity" associated with the Aeroflot 
case, but also claimed that a diversion of funds did occur. (TRANSCRIPT, 
OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST, 16 Nov 00; Federal News 
Service, via lexis-nexis) Specifically, Berezovsky asserted that money from a 
profitable company (presumably Andava), which was used to make Aeroflot a 
"normal company," was used also to finance both the Unity party's parliamentary 
race and President Putin's presidential campaign. In both the interview and an 
earlier published statement, Berezovsky implies that Putin was aware of the 
origin of his campaign funds. 
 
According to Boris Abramovich, his change of tack in relation to the president 
came after remarks Putin made to a French newspaper concerning his 
determination to use a "cudgel" to deal with Berezovsky and his ilk. After months 
of denial, it seems Boris Abramovich's eyes have been opened to the possibility 
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that his candidate did not remain grateful. The Putin government doesn't just 
want to control his media holdings, it wants what Putin always said it wanted: to 
pry loose the oligarchs' hold on the government and Kremlin -- well, at least the 
grip of those oligarchs with a propensity for independent political initiative. 
 
Berezovsky, as yet, has offered no proof of Putin's complicity in illegal campaign 
financing (would it make the papers if he did?), so it is still possible that a deal 
may be struck that would allow him to return to Russia with no further threat of 
prosecution. For that to occur, however, Berezovsky would have to prove his 
loyalty to the Putin regime anew and maintain a much lower profile. 
 
In the meantime, the Putin government, together with the prosecutor's office and 
the tax police, will continue to target key media and financial interests that could 
serve potentially as outlets for political challenges. Vladimir Gusinsky and 
Berezovsky are, thus far, the most well-known targets. The reintegration of the 
arms export companies and the removal and replacement of the Yel'tsin Family 
friend Aleksei Ogarev indicated another. The utilities and oil companies appear 
likely to be next. 
 
From all reports, Putin is methodical and detail-oriented. In order to maintain his 
strong central control and enforce his "dictatorship of laws," there can be no 
popular, vocal opposition. First, control the means of communication. Next, in 
Putin's Russia? Why, deny access to the capital that could finance dissent. 
 
Kremlin politics as usual or a challenge to the president? 
Two interesting events suggest personnel changes loom in the Kremlin or the 
government or both. In the first incident, a general was transformed into a 
civilian. In the second, a presidential confidant and government minister was 
summoned for questioning by the St. Petersburg prosecutor's office. 
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On 9 November, President Putin discharged Sergei Ivanov, secretary of the 
Security Council (SC), from his military service as a general in foreign 
intelligence. Ivanov explained his request for the discharge by describing the 
various conflicts he found between his military status and his duties as SC 
secretary. He also proclaimed himself to be a "civilian" official now. (INTERFAX, 
1615 GMT, 9 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1109, via World News Connection) The 
only position for which there has been any clamor for a civilian appointment has 
been at the defense ministry, and it is, of course, possible that Ivanov will 
supplant Igor Sergeev there. Persistent rumors, suggest nonetheless, that Ivanov 
actually may be in line to replace Mikhail Kasyanov as prime minister. Ivanov's 
conjectured main rival for the post is viewed to be Putin's friend from the St. 
Petersburg administration and the current finance minister, Aleksei Kudrin. 
 
Isn't it fascinating then, that less than two weeks after Ivanov's civilian facelift, the 
St. Petersburg prosecutor summoned Kudrin for interrogation about the city's 
financial dealings from 1992 to 1996? During those years, both the president and 
Kudrin served as deputy mayors. Will, then, the president be interrogated also? 
 
It is difficult to imagine that Kudrin would have information relevant to the 
investigation, and Putin would not. Therefore, Kudrin's summons to the 
prosecutor's office would be seen naturally as an attack on Putin as well. On the 
day Kudrin was called in, however, he was unable to attend as he was traveling 
with the president in Novosibirsk. On the trip, Putin apparently threatened to 
dissolve the government when he learned of thefts at a nuclear institute. He also 
charged Kudrin with improving the situation. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 21 Nov 00; 
via lexis-nexis) This incident, along with a later rebuke from Putin over the slow 
payment of servicemen's benefits, are now cast as evidence that the president 
has lost confidence in his former colleague and current finance minister. 
 
According to the director of the Center for Strategic Studies Director, Andrei 
Piontkovsky, "The war is on between Putin's old KGB clan and their St. 
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Petersburg rivals." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 1120 PST, 23 Nov 00; via 
afp@clari.net) The sought-after prize is the prime minister's seat. It may make 
sense that the current finance minister would seek greater control over the 
economic situation as a whole through the prime ministerial post, but what is to 
be gained for a security services general (pardon me, former general), in this 
scramble for the premiership? 
 
Questions abound. What could Ivanov accomplish that the trusted Kudrin could 
not? Would Kudrin balk at an ever-widening re-nationalization of industries? Is 
the issue the degree of state inspection of all industry? Or are the security 
services simply prepared to direct as many facets of Russian life as they can 
swallow? 
 
One fact re-emerges from this renewed Kremlin/government struggle: The 
Security Council continues to exist as a personality-driven organ of power. 
Without a strong and trusted leader, it appears as little more than a redundant 
state organ. If Ivanov does move to a new post, it will likely recede into the 
Kremlin shadows until Putin finds a need to revive it. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
In the spirit of Thanksgiving 
Edmund Pope's trial was adjourned early on 23 November so that he could 
return to his cell for some turkey, courtesy of the US Moscow Embassy. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 23 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) And there is some 
cause for him to be thankful. On Monday, 27 November, new evidence finally 
was accepted by the Moscow City Court, including copies of his medical history 
and an authorization of the Bauman University's permanent commission for a 
report by Professor Babkin to be sent abroad. According to Pope's attorney, the 
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authorization should exonerate his client by proving that no secret data were to 
be transferred. (INTERFAX, 27 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Earlier, the prosecution's 
position was undermined by the discovery that Yuri Plotnikov, a member of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB) investigation team that worked on Pope's case, is 
the son of state prosecutor Oleg Plotnikov. The defense's request that the elder 
Plotnikov be dismissed "because all the evidence received in court might be non-
objective" was denied, but on Monday, 20 November, he was replaced by Yuri 
Volgin... for medical reasons. A letter from Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily 
Kolmogorov, explaining that Plotnikov had suffered a stroke and might be 
hospitalized, was read in court. (ITAR-TASS, 20 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Yuri 
Plotnikov sometimes is referred to as one of the chief investigators -- this sheds 
an interesting light on the statement attributed to Putin that the job of the "chief 
investigator" depends on winning the case. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 11 Nov 
00) But it is too early to rejoice: If this case is dismissed, or if Edmund Pope is 
acquitted, he may have another ordeal to face. A civil suit demanding $252 
million in damages, filed by the Russian Navy and dismissed by the current 
judge, may be filed again after the trial ends. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 24 
Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Another victim of an espionage charge, Grigori Pasko, 
after being acquited by a court, is being tried once more. 
 
Above the law 
Among the 49 passengers on a flight from Makhachkala, the capital of the 
Dagestan region, to Moscow were Dagestani Finance Minister Abdusamad 
Gamidov, his six bodyguards, members of a soccer club and two FSB officers. 
Shortly after takeoff, a man wearing a device he claimed to be a bomb 
demanded that the flight be redirected to Israel. He then locked himself in the 
cockpit, appropriating the guns handed over by the bodyguards, as per flight 
regulations. Meanwhile, a thrilling scene took place in the passenger area. The 
soccer fans, bodyguards and secret service men were all equally suspicious of 
each others' thuggish appearance. Shikhabuddin Mikhailov, the soccer club 
manager, and a few club members searched agitated FSB officer Oleg Lutsenko, 
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finding a military knife, but missing a pistol that dropped from under his arm to his 
seat, and a short-barreled Kalashnikov rifle in his bag. When the plane stopped 
to refuel, Lutsenko, who declined to explain how he got his weapons through 
security, pulled out the gun, shouted that he was a member of an anti-terrorist 
squad, ordered his colleague to take the Kalashnikov, and proceeded to search 
the passengers. Mikhailov explained who he and his companions were, and 
together the men searched the rest of the passengers. The story had a happy 
ending: The airplane landed in Israel, the mentally unstable hijacker, identified as 
Akhmed Amirkhanov, was persuaded to give up, and was handed over to Russia 
by the Israeli authorities on condition that he would not be sentenced to death. 
(Israel does not apply the death sentence except for Nazi war criminals like Adolf 
Eichmann.) No passengers were harmed, but questions about security need to 
be answered. (LOS ANGELES TIMES, 15 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis, and THE 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, 17 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Russia's Iran policy: reneging on past promises to the US 
In the midst of the US election turmoil, Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
steered his country into the diplomatic limelight. Whether it is the resumption of 
Russian involvement in the Middle East peace talks (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 
11 Nov 00) or a new nuclear initiative, Putin appears to be taking advantage of 
the diplomatic opportunity afforded him to pursue several Russian policies with 
renewed vigor. One area that has continually complicated US-Russian relations -
- Russian arms sales to Iran -- particularly demonstrates Putin's attempt to take 
advantage of the US government's apparent preoccupation. 
 
On 24 November, the Russian government announced that, as of 1 December, it 
would renege on its secret 1995 deal with the US not to supply Iran with 
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conventional arms beyond the year 1999. The agreement, signed under the 
auspices of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, allowed Russia to sell certain 
weapons to Iran in exchange for Moscow's pledge that it would end all deliveries 
of sophisticated conventional arms to Tehran by 31 December 1999. Moscow's 
latest decision came on the heels of the US election season, during which the 
contents of the 1995 deal emerged. Citing the supposed leak as well as the 
supposedly improving domestic situation in Iran, Moscow, in a letter to Madeleine 
Albright which arrived days before the election, announced its intention to 
withdraw from the agreement and resume arms sales to Iran. The timing of the 
letter and the flimsy Russian argument that the US effectively had broken the 
agreement first by leaking its contents suggest that Russia is simply using the 
current state of affairs as a pretext for continuing potentially lucrative sales to 
Iran. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, 23 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
For Russia, arms sales constitute a prime means of bolstering its failing 
economy. Already the Iranian government has announced its intention to 
purchase aircraft and anti-aircraft systems with a price tag estimated at $2 billion. 
Russia claims that the agreement has cost it several billion dollars in lost sales to 
Iran over the past decade. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, 23 Nov 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
The US government assesses Russian arms sales to Iran as a potentially 
destabilizing force in the Middle East, contending that Tehran is a major supplier 
of the terrorist Islamic Hizbollah group that opposed the direction of the current 
Middle East talks. As such, the US government has threatened to impose 
sanctions against Russia if Moscow allows the transfers to take place. 
(REUTERS, 28 Nov 00; via RussiaToday.com) The sides, which have already 
discussed the issue at the APEC summit in Brunei and the OSCE meeting, will 
meet in Moscow next week to discuss the issue. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
29 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Volgograd gears up for elections 
On 24 December 2000, the residents of Volgograd will go to the polls to cast 
ballots for the region's governor and mayor of the city of Volgograd. 
 
Presently, only the incumbent governor, Nikolai Maksyuta, has registered for the 
election, but this is sure to change. It seems that his chances for re-election are 
good: The economy is moving forward and the grain harvest is twice as large as 
last year. It also helps that the regional media is in his back pocket. 
 
Even so, Maksyuta is taking no chances. Recently, the governor had the regional 
Duma lower the percentage of turnout required to validate an election from 50 
percent to 25 percent. This move is constitutional; however, critics see it as an 
attempt to ensure Maksyuta's re-election. 
 
Volgograd Mayor Yuri Chekhov has become the loudest critic of this change, as 
well as of other moves by the governor. This is in keeping with the political 
competition between various regional governors and the mayors of their 
respective cities. And, as with the relationships between governors and mayors 
in others regions, Chekhov seems to be angling for support from Moscow. 
Indeed Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov are said to be close friends. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 27 Oct 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1027, via World News Connection) 
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It is far from clear whether Chekhov's gamble will work, since Putin is courting 
the nation's governors through the creation of a State Council and the erection of 
federal districts. If Putin does manage to persuade the governors to cease 
opposition to his centralizing tendencies, the country's mayors may become a 
potentially important source for the defense of Russian federalism. 
 
Parliamentary immunity used to hide from legal action 
According to the nation's security services, there are virtually no regions left 
where the list of candidates for public office does not include the names of 
someone from the criminal underworld. For example, in Yekaterinburg, "crime 
bosses" from the Uralmash and Center groupings ran in elections to the oblast 
and city dumas and some won. In the Tyuman Oblast, one of the most powerful 
organized crime groups reportedly is in control of the city Duma. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 1 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1031, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The idea of immunity against criminal prosecution for members of parliament is 
to protect them from legal action filed by political opponents. In Russia, this 
seems to have reversed itself: The Duma is there to protect illegal acts of its 
members. This should not be allowed to continue. President Putin has declared 
war on crime and corruption. Let us see if it includes criminals protected by 
parliamentary immunity. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
First real step towards reform underway 
Recent decisions by Russia's Security Council constitute the first steps to real 
reform in the military and security services. Despite the rancorous and 
sometimes heated debate of the past year on the nature of restructuring, 
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consensus and an impetus towards beginning to implement these initiatives are 
reflected in recent statements from various politicians and military leaders. What 
remains to be seen is how much reshuffling President Putin will need to make in 
the senior military leadership to ensure that bureaucratic resistance does not 
interfere with his initiatives. In fact, Putin's rather scathing comments to his senior 
military leadership at a recent staff conference seemed further to indicate the 
seriousness of his reform initiative and a probable shake-up of the leadership. 
While careful not to criticize the military as an institution, or even field-level 
personnel and common soldiers, Putin laid blame on the senior staff officers in 
Moscow for allowing the forces to atrophy. He stated that the armed forces today 
are "unequal" in morale, discipline, and equipment to the missions they are 
assigned. He repeated the recently heard theme of the need to ensuring that pay 
and living standards for the common soldier are elevated along with the material 
readiness of the conventional military forces. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 
21 Nov 00) Two of the critical steps in achieving this reform are reducing the 
number of excess personnel in uniform and re-aligning defense funds and 
priorities to vital needs, especially the rising relative importance of the 
conventional forces over the strategic missile forces. 
 
Summary of reductions 
With over 3 million personnel serving in the military and security services, and 
many in often-duplicative roles, the Russian political leadership has finally acted 
on reducing this burden. The following table summarizes the largest proposed 
reductions: 
 
 Organization                  Reduction          Implementation 
 Army                       180,000 servicemen  2001-2003 
 Navy                         50,000 servicemen  2001-2003 
 Army & Navy       120,000 civilians  2001-2003 
 Air & Air Defense Forces  40,000 servicemen  2001-2003 
 SRF             10 divisions; 80,000 servicemen  by 2006 
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 Internal Troops 20,000 servicemen   
Railroad Troops 10,000 servicemen   
 Border Troops 5,000 servicemen   
 (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 11 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1113, and INTERFAX, 
1157 GMT, 23 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1123, via World News Connection) 
Within those reductions, approximately 400 generals and admirals will be retired 
and over 240,000 other officer billets will be eliminated. In total, nearly 600,000 
personnel will be cut out of the current 3 million-strong military and security force 
structure. There are conflicting reports that the airborne forces will be slightly 
reduced by 5,500 troops, as stated by one airborne commander, or that they will 
be excluded from this round of restructuring, as indicated by Putin in previous 
comments. (ITAR-TASS, 1321 GMT, 22 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1122, via 
World News Connection) Emergency Ministry Civil Defense troops will be cut by 
20% by 2005 (a reduction of 5,000 troops). As with personnel reductions in the 
other services, all funds saved by these cutbacks will remain in the budget and 
be applied to pay account shortfalls and procurement of new equipment. (ITAR-
TASS, 1103 GMT, 14 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1114, via World News 
Connection) Implementation details for this round of reductions are being 
developed currently and the defense ministry is due to report its findings to Putin 
in early December. A second round of restructuring and reductions is expected in 
2001 with the principal focus to be on the security services and elimination of 
redundant capabilities. 
 
Possible leadership changes 
As Russian Federation Security Council Secretary, Sergei Ivanov, stressed, the 
current force constitutes an "unbearable burden" for the Russian economy and 
these reductions, principally from the rear service and management structures, 
will not impact Russian combat capability negatively. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 
11 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1113, via World News Connection) This is a 
particularly important view as Ivanov is rumored to be a strong contender to 
replace General Igor Sergeev and become the first civilian defense minister. If 
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Sergeev is retired or replaced soon, it will fall to his successor to implement the 
reform policies. Sergeev certainly has been viewed by Chief of the General Staff 
Anatoli Kvashnin as the main protagonist in a long-running debate over the 
priorities between conventional and nuclear forces. As a former commander of 
the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), Sergeev advocated maintaining the SRF's 
independence as a separate military arm and its prominent funding status. And 
while current reform proposals envisage only reductions of the SRF's force 
structure, personnel and budget, indications point to an eventual breakup of the 
force and consolidation of its reduced segments with parts of the Army and Air 
Force. This further reform may be delayed only as long as Sergeev remains as 
defense minister and can offer bureaucratic resistance from within. Moreover, it 
will be interesting to study which senior officers are asked to retire in the planned 
force reductions as a consequence of their previously expressed views on the 
proposed military reforms. 
 
Consensus is building 
Building support for the new reform initiatives comes not only from possible 
removal of defense ministry members who may oppose them, but also from a 
diverse group of other military leaders and politicians whose support will be 
required to ensure reform is implemented in more than name only. This type of 
support appears to be developing from several different directions. 
 
The Duma Defense Committee voted for the distribution of extra funds for 
defense allocations essentially in accordance with the reform plans proposed by 
President Putin. The deputy chairman of the committee, Alexei Arbatov, said of 
the extra 12.6 billion rubles for defense, "these funds will be spent on most 
pressing needs, above all on the upkeep of the forces, pay to servicemen and 
equipment of the army." Arbatov stated there was a heated debate but ultimately 
the committee arrived at a decision similar to that of the government. (ITAR-
TASS, 1344 GMT, 14 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1114, via World News 
Connection) 
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The liberal Russian party, the Union of Right Forces, issued a statement hailing 
the government's military reform initiatives as the appropriate steps towards a 
professional army, firmly under civilian control, which does not interfere in politics 
and guarantees the social security of the uniformed servicemen and military 
retirees. (RIA, 0947 GMT, 16 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1116, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The support of military district commanders and operational unit field 
commanders will be required also to realize fully the capability to reform the 
armed forces. The Leningrad Military District commander, Colonel-General 
Valentin Bobryshev, reflected this view when he told reporters he believed the 
proposed force cuts would not hurt the country's defense potential and are 
important to achieve desired military readiness. (ITAR-TASS, 1408 GMT, 9 Nov 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1109, via World News Connection) 
 
Elimination of redundancy -- increase in efficiency 
The Russians view this initial 20% reduction in personnel coupled with a modest 
increase in the defense budget as key steps in increasing efficiency and 
professionalism of the force. Officials quote funding per capita of service 
personnel as an important measure in evaluating their forces qualitatively. 
Combining the planned force reductions with current economic calculations and 
budget predictions, the resulting estimates show that in five years spending per 
soldier will double and by 2010 the value will triple today's levels. The implied 
result is a leaner, yet more capable and professional force. Even if the economic 
forecasts on which these assumptions are based are borne out and projected 
small but steady increases to military spending continue, Russia still needs to 
take dramatic strides in personnel training and retention of qualified enlisted 
personnel if it is to achieve the desired professional advancements in its 
conscription-based service. 
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Continuing pressure for 'welfare of the troops' 
Slowly taking root in budget and reform discussions throughout the summer and 
gaining momentum following the public outcry over the Kursk disaster (which 
only highlighted further the plight of the conventional forces) is the pressure to 
"fix" the social problems of the service personnel. The current consensus of 
various political and military leaders, along with the public outcry, seems likely to 
ensure that the welfare of the troops is addressed as a primary concern in the 
budget process. Following the Security Council decisions on force reductions, the 
Federation Council stressed the need for social security for the military members 
who will be transferred out of active service, and called for an increase in military 
wages and state housing availability for service members. (ITAR-TASS, 1147 
GMT, 14 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1114, via World News Connection) General 
Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), stated, 
"we have to resolve the social issues of servicemen who will be made 
redundant." (ITAR-TASS, 1747 GMT, 14 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1114, via 
World News Connection) Even with force reductions, it is questionable whether 
significant funding will remain genuinely to upgrade and improve the condition of 
the conventional forces' hardware after all the lagging pay, housing, and 
retirement issues are fully funded. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Heads and bodies, bodies and heads 
A missing journalist, a disappearing headless body, shrapnel, jewelry and a 
disembodied head combined this month to create a mystery to rival anything 
mystery author Patricia Cornwell could imagine. 
 
 15 
On 3 November, a decapitated body was discovered in a forest outside 
Tarashcha, a small village in the Kyiv oblast. By mid-November, a group of 
journalists who had worked with missing Ukrainska Pravda editor Georgy 
Gongadze were in Tarashcha trying to determine if the body was that of their 
friend. 
 
According to one account carried in the Kyiv Post, Ukrainska Pravda's new editor 
Olena Prytula was shown "an x-ray of the corpse's hand" with "small metal 
fragments in the same place where Gongadze was injured by shrapnel" while 
reporting on the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia in 1993. (KYIV POST, 21 Nov 00; 
via KPnews.com) Based on this, as well as on pictures of jewelry found on the 
body, Prytula positively identified the body as Gongadze's, and was issued a 
death certificate by the local coroner. 
 
Later that day, however, before Gongadze's wife arrived to view the body, it was 
removed by detectives working for the prosecutor general. Where did it go and 
why was it removed? "At this point," Prosecutor General Myhailo Potebenko told 
Deutsche Presse Agentur, "we can not provide answers to those questions." 
(DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, 1125 CET, 22 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) 
Meanwhile, Deputy Interior Minister Mykola Dzhiga cautioned reporters to 
remember that "nobody can say for sure that this is Gongadze's body." 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 16 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Those words did nothing to 
sway Prytula, however. "It seemed clear to us it was the body of our Georgy," 
she said. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, 1206 CET, 16 Nov 00; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
Confusion also surrounds a skull found in the same area as the body claimed to 
be Gongadze's. According to Potebenko, that head most likely does not belong 
to the body confiscated by his office, but instead belongs to another body. "We 
have reason to believe that the head belonged to a woman," he said, and then 
announced that two other headless corpses had been found in Tarashcha. 
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(DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, 1125 CET, 22 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) 
Shockingly, details on those bodies are also quite sketchy. But residents of 
Tarashcha must be watching where they step. 
 
Dzhiga announced that DNA results would be run on the confiscated body and 
would be released to the public. Gongadze's friends -- and even some legislators 
-- aren't holding their breath. On 21 November, several lawmakers asked that 
foreign forensic experts be brought in to examine the remains. At the same time, 
Ukrainian journalists are suggesting that The Case of the Disappearing Body is 
yet another example of law enforcement corruption -- the same corruption that 
Gongadze railed against in Ukrainskay Pravda, and the same corruption that 
many believe led to his disappearance. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Peacekeepers? 
At the 1999 Istanbul Summit, the OSCE welcomed "the commitment by the 
Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the 
territory of Moldova by the end of 2002" and took note "of the positive role of the 
joint peacekeeping forces in securing stability in the region." (ISTANBUL 
SUMMIT DECLARATION, paragraph 19) The statements raised eyebrows 
among those who had watched Russia repeatedly ignore previous agreements to 
withdraw, saw scarce evidence of any new Russian commitment to do so, and 
feared that these latest promises were just one more delaying tactic. (For further 
background, see Behind the Breaking News, 1 Dec 99; www.bu.edu/iscip) 
 
Just one year later, this fear has apparently become reality. Russia has not only 
dropped all pretense of withdrawing its forces -- actually left over from the days of 
the Soviet Union -- but also apparently is standing by as the Transdniestr military 
takes up arms once again. 
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On 20 November, the OSCE celebrated the anniversary of the Istanbul Summit 
by bemoaning the fact that "the negotiating process for a lasting settlement of the 
Transdniestrian problem has not made significant progress." In particular, the 
statement noted, "Little progress has been made on paragraph 19 of the Istanbul 
Declaration. The last shipment of Russian arms and military equipment left the 
Transdniestrian region of Moldova on 19 November 1999." Even more important, 
the statement criticized Russian forces -- whom they call "peacekeepers" -- still in 
the region for not finding "ways to reduce the current unacceptable level of direct 
military confrontation between the former combatants." Finally, it denounced the 
"presence of unauthorized military units in the Security Zone." (OSCE PRESS 
RELEASE, 20 Nov 00) 
 
Those unauthorized forces -- almost, if not entirely, Transdniestrian -- have 
moved steadily into the demilitarized zone that Russian officials repeatedly have 
claimed to be "stabilizing" and "protecting." In fact, these officials have used this 
"peacekeeping" function as justification for ignoring commitments to withdraw. If 
we do, they say, fighting will begin again. 
 
Unfortunately, fighting has begun again anyway, and thanks to the Russian 
presence, the balance of power is totally on the side of the breakaway republic. 
Just two days after the OSCE statement, the Helsinki Committee announced that 
a "Transdniestrian column" had entered the village of Kitskan in the security 
zone, raped several women, beat several others, kidnapped a number of 
persons, and eventually left the area. As evidenced by the OSCE's criticisms, this 
is obviously not the first such offense by Transdniestrian troops. At a press 
conference, which was unfortunately given much less attention than was 
Russia's commitment to withdraw last year, Helsinki Committee spokesman 
Stefan Uritu charged that the OSCE and Russia are "failing in their 
responsibilities" to keep the peace in the area. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE 
AGENTUR, 1618 CET, 22 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) 
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Unfortunately, given Moldova's pitiful economic and political situation, and 
Russia's powerful position in the region, it is unlikely that much attention will be 
paid to the OSCE's suggestion that an international peacekeeping force might be 
necessary to curtail the renewed violence in the area. Perhaps if there had been 
a will for such a force one or more years ago, the situation today might be 
different. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: North Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Looking for a jihad? 
On 23 November Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev identified the biggest 
threats facing Russia as "religious extremism, separatism and international 
terrorism." Emanating from Central Asia and the North Caucasus, they are not 
distinct or unrelated phenomena but a "powerful army with centralized control." 
(INTERFAX, 1809 GMT, 23 Nov 00; via Turkistan Newsletter) Although Sergeev 
did not elaborate on what a military solution to the problems of religious 
extremism, separatism and terrorism would entail, the ruthless assault on 
Chechnya gives some indication. 
 
Sergeev's is only the most recent of many statements from the top Russian 
policy-making circles which tend to regard certain ideological currents within 
Islam as a major threat to Russia and view them as aspects of a coordinated 
international assault. According to this logic, foreign clients usually identified as 
the Gulf states or Afghanistan use Islam to motivate Muslim separatist 
movements in Russia and Central Asia. 
 
However, the evidence of international coordination is thin, at least where it 
pertains to Chechnya. According to what can be ascertained by Western 
journalists, the scale of such international cooperation is so small that it simply 
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cannot account for the Chechen resistance. For all of the Russian blustering 
about thousands of foreign mercenaries fighting in Chechnya, only four have 
been taken prisoner. (THE ECONOMIST, 7 Jul 00) A French journalist, Anne 
Nivat, who was in Chechnya from October 1999 to February 2000, said that she 
had seen two foreign fighters -- the infamous commander Khattab and one other 
Arab who was with Arbi Baraev's detachment. In fact, according to Nivat, there 
were by far more Russians fighting on the Chechen side than there were Arabs. 
(Presentation at Harvard University, 28 Jun 00) 
 
Jihad begins at home 
While there is little reason to suppose that international sponsorship is 
responsible for the resilience of the Chechen resistance or the spread of radical 
currents of Islamic thought, there is evidence to suggest that Russia's anti-
Islamic policies have exacerbated dangerously religious and ideological 
divisions. One recent study based on extensive field research in Dagestan and 
published by the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) finds that anti-Wahhabi 
policies have limited indiscriminately religious freedom and have inadequately 
addressed the social issues that are most responsible for widespread discontent. 
(THE PROBLEM OF WAHHABISM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS, Institute for 
Ethnology and Anthropology, RAN, 29 Jun 00) 
 
The study begins as most such papers do with the difficulties of defining 
"Wahhabism," a term which has been applied to groups which have little else in 
common. [See Igor Rotar, ISLAM AND WAR, Moscow 1999, and Muriel Atkin, 
"The Rhetoric of Islamophobia," CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, No. 1 
(2000)] Yarlykapov settles on a very broad definition of Wahhabism: any 
fundamentalist or radical current within Sunni Islam. "Field studies allowed us to 
determine that the Wahhabi movement in Dagestan lacks a coherent structure or 
a single religious or legal doctrine." (p. 9) He then identifies strands of 
Wahhabism, some of which are quite amenable to compromise with the 
authorities. One of the chief issues of contention with local and federal authorities 
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is the Wahhabi preference for the adoption of shariah law. According to 
Yarlykapov, some Wahhabis are willing to postpone the advent of shariah law 
indefinitely. Another discovery is that in some locations, such as Kabardino-
Balkaria, shariah and adat (pre-Islam common law) existed for decades 
alongside the secular courts of the Soviet state. (Irina Leonidovna Babich, 
LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE NORTHWEST CAUCASUS, Institute for Ethnology 
and Anthropology, RAN, 20 Feb 00) 
 
Yarlykapov notes that Dagestani authorities took steps to suppress Wahhabis 
throughout the 1990s. The most repressive measures were anti-Wahhabi 
legislation of 1998 and a complete ban on the movement in September of 1999. 
Since the start of the war in Chechnya the representatives of the official faith 
structures have taken an even harder line: "Wahhabis can only be cured by a 
bullet," says the mufti, Akhmad-hadji Abdulaev, the representative of the Spiritual 
Board of Muslims of Dagestan. When it comes to Wahhabis, "There are no other 
paths besides extermination," says the head of the current Russian puppet 
government in Chechnya, Akhmad Khadji Kadyrov, until recently the mufti of 
Chechnya. (pp. 8-9) 
 
The law of 16 September 1999 forbids "wahhabist and other extreme activity" but 
fails to define these terms. The implementation of this law is carried out by MVD 
and police officers who predictably lack the religious education necessary to 
make these judgments. As a result the ordinary Muslim population is exposed to 
ignorant and unpredictable police harassment. The following examples were 
characterized as typical by the study: In the Nogai region several young men 
were jailed because they had quit drinking alcoholic beverages, and started 
studying Islamic religious thought and rituals. When Yarlykapov approached the 
local MVD personnel to persuade them to release these prisoners, the chief 
officer related that he held "lengthy discussions" with another suspected 
Wahhabi until the man "promised not to pray any more." (p. 10) Other instances 
of abuse include beatings; arrests on the grounds that a suspect wears a long 
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beard; random searches; as well as bans on religious publications, religious 
services, and the construction of madrases and mosques. 
 
Frequent denunciations of Wahhabism in the mass media, the portrayal of the 
Chechen war as a holy crusade (accompanied by footage of Orthodox priests 
blessing combat-bound divisions), and the broad legislation employed by the 
police to terrorize the Muslim population only bolster the impression among many 
Dagestanis that they are being governed by an alien and hostile power. At the 
local level, frustration with corruption is seen as a major irritant in the relations 
between the authorities and the public. 
 
Yarlykapov points to a more sensible approach which would curb the appetite for 
Wahhabi ideals by addressing the needs of the population. Such policies would 
include religious toleration in strict accordance with federal legislation, fostering 
religious education, job creation for the youth, curbing corruption, and forbidding 
the use of anti-Muslim catch phrases in the state-owned media. (pp. 14-15) If the 
authorities ignore such reasonable advice and continue to rely exclusively on the 
use of force, they will only exacerbate ideological confrontation and widespread 
public dissatisfaction. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Iran and Tajikistan: forging closer ties 
Tajikistan President Imomali Rakhmonov and Iranian President Mohammed 
Khatami agreed to forge closer ties during Rakhmonov's official visit to Tehran in 
November. The two leaders also exchanged views on regional security issues 
including the crisis in Afghanistan, and agreed to work together toward a 
peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict, in order to prevent a spillover into 
Central Asia. 
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Rakhmonov said the "Afghan crisis poses a threat to the whole region" and "the 
longer the war the more will be its consequential afflictions to the regional 
countries." (IRNA, 1854 GMT, 7 Nov 00; FBIS-NES-2000-1107, via World News 
Connection) Moreover, non-traditional security threats such as international 
terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and organized crime have 
undermined the Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, which shares a 
1,500-kilometer border with Afghanistan. Illegal weapons and narcotics have 
continued to flow across the Tajik-Afghan border, and the narcotics trade has 
spread from Tajikistan throughout much of Central Asia. (THE SOVIET AND 
POST-SOVIET REVIEW, 1996) According to the United Nations, "drug traffickers 
use routes through Tajikistan to smuggle drugs from Afghanistan -- the world's 
largest producer of opium -- to Russia and the West." (BBC NEWS, 20 Oct 00) 
Despite the presence of Russian border guards and infantry (approximately 
10,000 Russian border troops and a motorized infantry division are stationed in 
Tajikistan), Tajikistan is still considered by regional experts as the weakest point 
in the Central Asian security system. 
 
Tajikistan's five-year civil war also has eroded security in Central Asia. The 
country's eastern provinces have served as a staging area for opposition forces 
and international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU). In August, the IMU reportedly staged several incursions from 
bases in Tajikistan into a remote mountainous region bordering Uzbekistan and 
southern Kyrgyzstan. The situation is leading other Central Asian states to 
consider reprisals against Tajikistan if Dushanbe is unable to control its borders. 
(JANE'S DEFENCE, 25 Apr 00) However, Dushanbe has asserted that very little 
armed opposition remains in the country and has called charges of armed 
militants infiltrating the territory of neighboring states from Tajikistan "unfounded." 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 16 Sep 00; via The Current Digest Of The Post-
Soviet Press) While, theoretically, the situation might call for increased 
surveillance of the Tajik-Afghan border, as well as rapid reaction forces to defend 
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that border, Tajikistan has neither the military or financial resources to do so. 
Consequently, this consideration might be used by Moscow to increase still 
further Russian intervention in Tajikistan. 
 
Iran and Tajikistan are to continue to discuss regional security issues on the CIS 
southern borders, including ways to end the Afghanistan crisis. The two countries 
already have participated in a UN-sponsored roundtable discussion of the "Six 
plus Two" group -- Russia and the United States, as well as China, Iran, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which border on Afghanistan -
- over the problems in Afghanistan. The Taliban, which is estimated to control 
approximately 95 percent of Afghanistan, is viewed as posing a serious threat to 
the region. Taliban victories against the northern alliance in the mountainous 
northeastern corner of Afghanistan after fierce fighting in September have 
displaced "tens of thousands" of persons. (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 17 Sep 
00; FBIS-NES-2000-0922, via World News Connection) An estimated 150,000 
persons in northern Afghanistan have taken shelter in the Pamir mountains on 
the border with Tajikistan. However, Tajikistan lacks the resources to deal with 
this growing refugee crisis. Humanitarian relief, including UN assistance, is 
required to prevent a disaster. 
 
Iran and Tajikistan are expanding parliamentary ties and economic cooperation 
through various contact groups and joint commissions. Iran is decidedly 
interested in increasing cooperation with Tajikistan in the military sphere. Indeed, 
common security is indispensable for harnessing the Caspian basin's untapped 
energy resources and supply routes. The region is thought by analysts to contain 
key global energy reserves and to be geographically well positioned to respond 
to sharp increases in world demand for oil and gas, particularly in East Asia and 
South Asia. Ira’n wants to capitalize on the revenues that will result from the 
exploitation of Caspian energy products. (JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 1 
Apr 98) While some have argued that a north-south pipeline across Iran would be 
the shortest and cheapest route for transporting Caspian oil, Iran remains, of 
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course, on the US Congress list of terror-supporting states and providing Tehran 
with a stranglehold on oil would hardly be considered safe. 
 
Iran and the Central Asian states have much to gain from regional stability, and 
much to lose from regional conflict. The recent breakthrough in Iran-Tajikistan is 
likely to enhance Iran's prestige throughout the region and provide it with a 
foothold in Central Asia. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
ESTONIA 
The mysterious case of the disappearing document 
Who signed what and where is the document now? These are the questions 
facing the Estonian government, as the existence of an agreement concerning 
the treatment of ex-KGB officers in the republic has come to light. 
 
Information about the document surfaced during a lawsuit brought against the 
government by a former KGB agent who, with his family, was denied a residence 
permit. In the agreement, signed in December 1991 by then-Minister Raivo Vare 
and Vyacheslav Shironin, special envoy of the Soviet security service, the 
Estonian government pardoned KGB officers for their past activities in exchange 
for thousands of files, weapons and special equipment. (BNS, 1148 GMT, 30 Oct 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1030, via World News Connection) 
 
Part of the conflict surrounds what else the agreement covered. According to the 
press service of the Russian embassy in Tallinn, the Estonian government of 
Edgar Savisaar also pledged to secure social, political and personal rights for 
KGB employees and their families. (BNS, 1515 GMT, 7 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
1107, via World News Connection) The current government, under PM Mart 
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Laar, has to take the embassy's word for it, since the government's copies -- in 
Estonian and in Russian -- haven't been seen since the Savisaar cabinet left 
power. 
 
While no one has denied the existence of the document, a panel of legal experts 
declared earlier this month that the agreement is no longer valid since the laws of 
Estonian have changed since 1991. Russian officials, and an Estonian court, 
disagree. On 8 November, the Tallinn administrative court pronounced invalid 
Justice Minister Mart Rask's decree denying residence permits to the family of 
former KGB employee Sergei Buchelovsky. In the case that brought the Vare-
Shironin document into public discussion, the court ruled that blanket denials of 
applications were unacceptable, and authorities can refuse residence permits to 
former security services personnel only in instances where there is proof of guilt 
and of a continued threat. (BNS, 1751 GMT, 8 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1108, 
via World News Connection) According to Article 11 of the Estonian Law on 
Citizenship, naturalized citizenship cannot be granted to persons who "have been 
members of staff, informers, agents or owners of secret addresses of the KGB of 
the USSR (LSSR) or a security service, intelligence service or other special 
services of other foreign state, if this fact was established according to the 
procedure stipulated by the law"; no mention is made of residence permits, 
however. 
 
A parliamentary committee has been established to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding the signing and subsequent disappearance of the 
agreement. Undoubtedly, Vare and Savisaar will face tough questioning when 
they appear before the committee. A spokesman for the Fatherland Alliance, 
which initiated the bill establishing the investigation, said the agreement "is a so-
called secret pact, which attempted to provide rights for former collaborators of 
the Soviet Estonian KGB, pensioners and members of their families, which are in 
conflict with a number of subsequent legal acts of the Republic of Estonia." (BNS, 
1413 GMT, 15 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1115, via World News Connection) Rask 
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and Interior Minister Tarmo Loodus have declared the agreement to be a 
historical-political document without any legal force. 
 
Subsequently, opposition deputies in the Riigikogu called for a commission to 
check into possible links between top government officials and the KGB. Until 31 
December, officials are required to state under oath that they have not been tied 
to the security services of another country. The proposed commission would be 
tasked with investigating ties of the president, MPs, ministers, the legal 
chancellor, the State Audit Office chairman, the Supreme Court chairman, the 
central bank governor and the army commander once the oath ceases to be 
required. (ETA NEWS AGENCY, 0906 GMT, 23 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1123, 
via World News Connection) 
 
LATVIA 
The Bolsheviks are coming! 
In one action-packed week in mid-November, Latvian government officials at first 
downplayed threats posed by Russian extremists, and then had to cope when 
those threats proved to be only the beginning of the excitement. 
 
Russian security officials passed word to their Latvian counterparts that members 
of a Russian extremist organization planned a publicity stunt in Riga. Interior 
ministry spokesman Normunds Belskis told the press on 13 November that the 
report from the FSB was being analyzed, but security authorities in Tallinn 
believed the actual threat was exaggerated. (BNS, 1028 GMT, 13 Nov 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1113, via World News Connection) Two days later, Belskis had cause 
to regret his statement, as Latvian police detained four members of the Russian 
extremist movement the National Bolsheviks, who had jumped off the St. 
Petersburg-Kaliningrad train and entered the country illegally. (BNS, 1439 GMT, 
15 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1115) Subsequently, police announced the 
detention of all National Bolshevik leaders based in Latvia, to check the possible 
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collaboration of Latvian and Russian groups. (LETA, 0913 GMT, 16 Nov 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1116, via World News Connection) 
 
Some Bolsheviks were missed in the roundups, however: Three young men 
entered St. Peter's Church in the center of Riga around 11 a.m. on 17 November, 
and proceeded to hold the church hostage. According to police, they pulled out 
what looked like grenades, threatening to blow themselves up unless their fellow 
Bolsheviks were released from detention. Instead, they were detained 
themselves, police said, after about an hour of negotiations. (BNS, 1305 GMT, 
17 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1117, via World News Connection) Later reports 
indicated that they were leaders of the Samara and Smolensk branches of the 
group. 
 
The Latvian Border Guard Service announced that the Border Guard and Latvian 
Railway had agreed to increase control of trains in transit. (BNS, 0933 GMT, 16 
Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1116, via World News Connection) 
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